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IN TilE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
BELLE ERICKSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.WALGREEN DRUG CO., a corporation,

Case No.
7444

Defendant and Appellant,

THE SALISBURY INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

THE FACTS
This is an appeal by the defendant, Walgreen Drug
Company, from a verdict and judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant, Walgreen Drug
Company, in the amount of $8,000.00 for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she fell at the
entrance to the Walgreen Drug Company store in Salt
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Lake City, Utah. As against the co-defendant, Salisbury
Investment Company, the jury rendered a verdict of no
cause of action, and the said Salisbury Investment Company is not a party to this appeal.
In this brief we shall refer to the parties as they
appeared in the Court below, except that the word "defendant'' shall be understood to mean only the defendant Walgreen Drug Company, unless the context otherwise indicates.
The defendant is a corporation engaged in the drug
store business in Salt Lake City, Utah, and operating
a drug store on the southeast corner of Second South
and Main Street, in a building owned by the co-defendant, Salisbury Investment Company, and occupied by
the defendant as lessee. (R. 31, 53.)
The public entrance to the defendant's store is at
_the northwest corner of the building, and consists of a
revolving door with ordinary doors on either side of
the revolving door. The entrance is set back from the
north and west pro;perty lines, and faces in a generally
northwesterly direction. There is a roof or canopy
over the entrance or approach, which leads from the
sidewalks to the doors. (R. 162, Ex. 1.)
The floor of the approach or entranceway is of a
material known as terrazzo. It has a gentle slope from
the doors toward the sidewalk on a line from the revolving door to the corner of the property line. The
slope is .23% from southeast to northwest on a line
running from the center of the revolving door to the
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northwest corner of the property line. From the door
south of the reYolYing door, the slope is 1% from east
to west. (R. 1:29, Ex. 3.)
On and prior to Septen1ber 25, 1948, the plaintiff
was employed by the Stover Bedding Company (R. 129).
On that date, she left work about 1:00 o'clock and went
home, (purchasing sOine groceries enroute), changed
clothes and caught a bus for the business section of
town. She rode the bus to the intersection of Second
South and l\Iain Streets, alighting on the northwest
corner of the intersection. It was starting to rain at
the time she left home (R. 125-126) and it was wet and
raining when the plaintiff arrived down town. She
crossed Main Street and then Second South Street, thus
placing herself on the southeast corner of the intersection and directly in front of the entrance to the defendant's store.· (R. 127.)
The plaintiff intended to go into the defendant's
store for the purpose of making a purchase. She approached the south door of the entrance from a point
almost due west thereof on the sidewalk (R. 128). At
the time she approached the store, she noticed that the
terrazzo entranceway was wet. (R. 127, 172). When
she was about four feet from the door, she reached out
to open it, and in doing so slipped, falling on her side,
sustaining the injuries for which she recovered judgment in the trial Court. She stated that the entranceway was smooth, slick and wet, and that it sloped. (R.
129.) The iplaintiff had walked several steps on the
terrazzo before falling. (R. 165.) She stated that the
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entire terrazzo surface was wet and apparently the
water had been tracked in. (R. 165.) She was walking
at an ordinary gait, that is, the gait of an average person, as she approached the doorway. She stated that at
the time she reached for the door, her left foot was forward and that her right foot slipped backward, causing
her to fall on her right hip. (R. 170.)
The plaintiff was thoroughly familiar with terrazzo
entrances and had walked on such entrances many times.
(R. 173-174.)
At the time of the accident the plaintiff was wearing shoes with heels which she described as "Cuban
heels," which were approximately 1lf2 to 2 inches high.
The heels were not of rubber, but of leather. They were
somewhat worn at the rear and on the outside so that
the nails were exposed and had been somewhat flattened
out and formed a rather smooth surface. (R. 118, Ex. 2~)
Plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant and alleged as negligence:

(a) that the en-

tranceway was constructed with a slight grade and of a
material which was smooth and polished and when wet
became very slick and slippery; and (b) that the defendant was negligent in failing to give warning to its
customers of the slippery condition of the entranceway
and in failing to place rubber mats or otper protective
n1~aterial. over the entranceway when defendant knew,
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known,
that the entranceway would be slick ·and slippery by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reason of its wet condition and the material of which it
was constructed.
Darrell Erickson, the plaintiff's son, testified that
he had observed that the entranceway to the defendant's
store was slippery when wet, and that on various occasions he had seen rubber mats placed on the entranceway (R. 199-200). The mats were opposite the revolving
door, (R. 202), and not in front of the south door.
Several expert witnesses testified as to the relative
safety of the entr-anceway.
Frank A. Caffall, a tile contractor, called by the
plaintiff, testified that he could not tell from its appearance whether the terrazzo entranceway to defendant's store had non-skid material or not (R. 183, 187),
but if it did have abrasive material in it, it would be
non-skid. (R. 188.)
On cross examination he admitted that many terrazzo entrances on Main Street of Salt Lake City were
sloped more steeply than the entrance to the defendant's
store. He also admitted the slope wasn't excessive, and
that without any slope the entranceway would be only
a little slippery when wet. (R. 180.) He further admitted that some tile is as slippery as terrazzo, (R. 191),
and that when cement is worn smooth it is as slippery
as terrazzo. ( R. 193.)
W. Y. Tipton, the superintendent of the Bureau of
Mechanical Inspection of Salt Lake City (R. 209) and a
licensed engineer (R. 210) testified that there were many
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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terrazzo entrances in Salt Lake City, and that most of
thmn had a greater slope than the entranceway to the
defendant's store. (R. 213-214). He also stated that the
ordinary slope of sidewalks in Salt Lake City is 14 of
,an inch to a foot or about 2%. (R. 213.) The slope of
the entranceway to the defendant's store in an east to
west direction from the south door of the entranceway
was 1%, (R. 211), and at a point four feet west of the
south door the north to south slope was 1.1% (R. 226).
On cross-examination, he testified that the sidewalk
around the defendant's store was as smooth as terrazzo
'
and would have about the same co-efficiency of friction
(R. 218-219).
Raymond J. Ashton, an architect of 30 years experience, who was associated with Gordon V. Kaufman in
designing the building which defendant occupies (R. 230)
testified that the specifications for the building called
for carborundum to be spread into the finished coat,
which would act as an abrasive in the terrazzo. (R. 231.)
The drawing called for a slope of 1j16 of an inch to
the foot, which is about 14 of the normal slope. The
entranceway to the store was unusually flat,-flatter by
far than the average entranceway. (R. 232.) The type
of construction employed in the defendant's entranceway was the safest type of construction that the profession had been able to employ.

On cross examination, he stated that the terrazzo
entranceway had abrasive in it (R. 233-234) and that
he could feel the carborundum grit present in the ter-
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7.
razzo. (R. 234, 235.) The entranceway was sloped in
two directions, but the slope was almost imperceptible.
(R. 134-13J.)
~Ir. Ashton also testified that a soft nrarble floor
and a tile floor are In ore hazardous than terrazzo. ( R.
136-137.) Architects specify carborundun1 in terrazz:)
so that rubber mats will not be necessary for skid protection. ( R. 138.)

Dr. George R. Hill, an Assistant Professor at the
University of Utah, with a doctor's degree in physical
chemistry, who was at the time of the trial engaged in
work on surface chemistry products for the Navy (R.
239) testified that he had verformed certain experiments upon the terrazzo entranceway to the defendant's
store, and also upon the city sidewalk adjacent to it,·
and that the said surfaces had the same co-efficiency
of friction when dry. (R. 241.) His experiments also
revealed that both the sidewalk and terrazzo had a
higher co-efficiency for static friction when wet than
when dry (R. 242), and that it would require more force
to start a foot sliding on wet terrazzo than on dry terrazzo. (R. 243.) He further stated that a person walking normally and straight ahead upon wet terrazzo surface, would have an increased friction, that is, it would
be harder for such person's foot to start sliding on a
wet surface than on a dry surface. (R. 245.) He stated
that terrazzo flooring was the most common type now
in use, but that marble, tile, cement and ·asphalt were
also used. In his opinion the entranceway to the WalSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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O'reen store was a safe surface. Dr. Hill also explained
that water on the surface of a terrazzo entrance would
act as a lubricant so that if a foot started to slide it
would then continue to slide along the surface. (R. 248.)
As to the surface to the defendant's entranceway, quite
a number of irregularities in the surface of the floor
were apparent to the touch (R. 250), and the carborundum had not worn off. (R. 252.)

b

Herbert Leichter testified that he had made a count
of the various types of entranceways to the stores and
business houses along Main Street, between South
Temple Street and Fourth South Street in Salt Lake
City, and he had found that in that district there were
81 entrances of terrazzo and 82 entrances composed of
other types of material combined-tile, cement, marble
and other compositions. (R. 255-256.) Most of these
entrances were oven to the weather, but a few had storm
doors. Some of the store keepers had rubber mats out
at the time the witness made his count, which was during stormy weather. (R. 257.)
The defendant offered to prove by the testimony of
Mr. Conley, the manager of defendant's store, that approximately 4,000 to 5,000 people eame into its store
every day, and that in the past fourteen or-fifteen years
it had never come to the attention of the defendant that
anyone had ever slipped on the. terrazzo 'entrance, either
when it was wet or dry. The plaintiff objected to the
testimony and it was rejected by the Court. (R. 263,
264, 275.) A similar offer on the part of the defendant,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Salisbury Investment Company, was likPwist> rejected
by the Court on objection by plaintiff.
\Ye have not detailed in our statement of facts the
injuries suffered by the plaintiff, since they are not material to the issues of this appeal.
Summarizing briefly the testimony of the expert
·witnesses, it may be stated that the entranceway to the
defendant's store has a slight, or almost im,perc~ptible
slope; that the slope is considerably less than the slope
ordinarily present in entranceways to business buildings in this locality and is less than that present in the
ordinary city sidewalks. It is constructed of a material
which is at least as safe as other types of building materials commonly used in entranceways in Salt Lake
City, and which is the most common type employed for
that purpose, and is at least as safe as the city sidewalks adjacent to the store.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
I. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT A FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART
OF THIS DEFENDANT, AND THE VERDICT IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
II. THE VERDICT IS INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT AND
AGAINST LAW.
III. THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING DEFENDANT'S PROFERRED TESTIMONY TO THE EFFECT THAT
THERE HAD BEEN NO ACCIDENTS AT THE PLACE IN
QUESTION DURING THE 15 YEARS PRIOR TO THE
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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TRIAL EXCEPT
PLAINTIFF.

THE

ACCIDENT

INVOLVING THIS

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF THIS DEFENDANT, AND
THE VERDICT IS UNSUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.

It is a fundamental principle that a land owner is
not an insurer of the safety of persons whom he has
invited to enter upon his premises. 38 Am. Jur. 92, 96,
131, 134. The only duty upon the part of the land owner
is to exercise ordinary care for the safety of his invitees. The duty is not to exercise reasonable care to
see that the premises are absolutely safe, but rather to
exercise ordinary care to see that the premises are
reasonably safe. This duty upon the part of a land owner
is based upon his superior knowledge of conditions upon
his premises. Where a dangerous condition is obvious,
or is as well known to the invitee as to the owner of the
premises, there is no obligation to give warning nor to
take steps to remedy the dangerous condition.
1Ye do not cite authorities for these principles at
this point. The principles will be found reiterated time
and again in the authorities hereinafter cited.
As heretofore pointed out with particularity, the
entranceway to the defendant's store was constructed
of terrazzo, a building material in common use in this
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locality for entranceways to comn1ercial buildings. It
was at a slight slope, but had a grade considerably less
than the average or nor1nal grade for entranceways to
buildings in Salt Lake City and less than the standard
:public sidewalk. The plaintiff was thoroughly familiar
with this entranceway, having traversed it many times
before. At the time she entered the building she observed that the entrance,,ray was wet and she concluded
that the water had been tracked in by other patrons of
the store. She also was familiar with other terrazzo
entranceways in the city of Salt Lake. She was as fully
cognizant of the condition of the premises as was the
defendant or any of its agents and servants.
\Ve have been unable to discover any Utah cas'~
closely similar on its facts. However, there are numerous cases from other jurisdictions. To cite and discuss
all of them in this brief would serve only to unduly prolong it and to overburden the Court. We have selected
for discussion only those cases which we considered
would be most helpful to the Court in determining the
case.
In 4 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, page 1824,
Sec. 798, it is said:
''Floors of marble or hardwood are in their
nature slipp,ery, but the use of such materials is
not in itself negligence. The same is true of concrete floors.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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And at page 1826 of the same authority it is said:
"Water, slush and mud tracked in upon a
floor by reason of weather conditions outside,
although it renders the floor wet, dirty and slippery, does not ordinarily create an actionable
situation. A wet and sloppy condition of the
floor may be necessarily incidental to the business or activity in question.''
The cases supporting these principles are legion.
Perhaps the leading case on this question is Mullen v.
Sensenbrenner Mere. Co., (Mo.), 260 S.W. 982. In that
case the plaintiff commenced an action for personal injuries sustained by her when she fell on the tile entrance
of the defendant's mercantile store in the city of St.
Louis. She alleged (similarly to the plaintiff in the case
at bar), that the tile entrance was unusually slick, smooth
and glassy and that it was at an unusually unsafe and
dangerous angle or slope. She likewise alleged that the
defendant failed to make such entrance safe for pedestrians by roughing the tiling or spreading sawdu8t
thereon, or rplacing rubber mats thereon, or other apparat~~

or material to prevent persons from sl~pping
and falling. She also charged negligence for failure to
give warning of the dangerous condition.
The plaintiff in that case was also a woman of advanced years, being 64 years of age. In that ease the
plaintiff had never been in the defendant's store before,
but she had noticed the entrance as she entered the
store and had seen that it was a tile floor and that it
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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had quite a slope to it. She had been in other stores
which had tile floors and they were nothing new to her.
As in the case at bar, the evidence at the trial
showed that there were many entrances made of the
same kind of tile as the entrance to the defendant '8
store and that such entrances were sloping.
In that case the defendant was permitted to prove
by the testimony of its president that the entranceway
had been built some years before and had been used by
hundreds of people daily ever since its construction, and
that there had never been any complaint of any person
slipping or falling in said entrance before or after the
plain tiff was injured.
The similarity of the facts in that case to those in
the case at bar will be readily apparent to the Court.
In holding that the slope of the entranceway did
not ·amount to negligence the Court said:
''In this case there was a rise of but 5 inches
in 5 feet in this entrance. It was not as dangerous as a step 6 inches high. Such entrances are
usual in business buildings, as much or more so
than steps. We therefore hold that the slope of
said incline of itself was no evidence of negligence.''
And in holding that the defendant was not negligent for failure to give warning or for failure to put
out rubber mats, the court stated as follows:
''As to whether the tile was so slick as to be
dangerous: Defendant's evidence is that the tile
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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floor was put down in 1915, and this accident happened four years afterward, and that in the
meantime thousands of peo:ple must have passed
over it before plaintiff was injured, and also
after plaintiff was injured, up to the time of the
trial, and that no other person was ever injured
thereon by slipping or otherwise, although it was
always in the same condition as when plaintiff
was injured. Such evidence conclusively shows
that said tile was not so slick, or said entrance
so sloping, or the crack therein so large or of
such character as not to be reasonably safe, without rugs or sawdust or any other covering thereon. * * * The proprietor in such cases is only required to exercise reasonable care to make the
floor reasonably safe for invitees, or to give the
invitee notice of dangers known to him and unknown to the invitee. Main v. Lehman, supra,
pp. 590-591, and cases there cited. In this case
the plaintiff fully viewe·d the entrance as she
went into the defendant's store. She saw that
it was of tile, and saw the kind of tile it was, and
could see and feel how smooth or slick it was.
She saw that it was without rugs or covering,
and noticed its slope. She was fully notified of
the condition and character of the entrance and
of all danger, if any, connected therewith when
she entered defendant's building. She says she
was familiar with sloping tile entrances, and that
they were all right going U!P, but the danger was
in walking down. Defendant knew of no condition or danger connected with said entrance not
known or visible to plaintiff. It was high noon,
and perfectly light. Under such circumstances
defendant was not liable for plaintiff's injury in
coming out of said building over such entrance,
In the Main case, supra, after reviewing numerous authorities in this state, we said, page 591:
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'In the case at bar, there is no evidence that the
defendant had previously know11 or regarded tl1e
step as dangerous, or that he knew or cotdd have
knozcn any more in regard to its characte-r as
being dangerous or otlu:rwise than by seeing it
and observing its location and surroundings,
u·hich the plaintiff had an opportttnity to and did
do at the time she entered the toilet.'
''And on page 592 of 294 Mo. we said : 'No
case is cited from this or any other jurisdiction,
and we have been unable to find any, where the
invitee had full knowledge and information immediately before his or her injury of the step or
other obstruction complained of, in which defendant was held guilty of negligence or liable
for the plaintiff's injury.'
''We hold that there was no evidence of defendant's negligence, and therefore the case
should not have been submitted to the jury.
"IV. Furthermore, while in the absence of
notice or knowledge of an obstruction or defect
in a street, a pedestrian may presume the way is
clear, yet, after notice. of any such defect, he is
guilty of contributory negligence if he shortly
afterwards fails to look out for such defect in
his pathway, and is injured thereby.'' (Italics
ours.)

The holding of the court in the above quoted case
has been consistently followed by the Missouri courts.
See:
Vogt v. Wurmb, (Mo.) 300 S.W. 278.
LOJppin v. St. Louis National League Baseball Club, (Mo. App.), 33 S.W. (2d) 1025.
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Paubel v. Hitz, (Mo.) 96 S.W. (2d) 369.
Reddy v. Jos. Oaravelli Inc., (Mo. App.) 102
s.w. (2d) 734.
Heidland v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., (Mo.
App.) 110 S.W. (2d) 795.
Beitch v. Central Terminal Co., (Mo. App)
122 s.w. (2d) 94.
Stoll v. First Nat'l. Bank of Indeypendence,
(Mo.) 134 S.W. (2d) 97.
Murray v. Ralph D'Oench Co., (Mo.) 147
s.w. (2d) 623.
Corley v. Kroger Grocer &; Baking Co., (Mo.
App.) 189 S.W. (2d) 178.
Schnall v. National Shirt Shops of Missouri
(Mo.) 193 S.W. (2d) 605.
The holding of the Supreme Court of Missouri has
also been given sanction by the appellate courts of many
other jurisdictions and its language has been oftimes
quoted. See for example:

Watkins v. Piggly Wiggly Bird Co., 31 Fed.
(2d) 889.
Bohannon v. Leonard- Fitzpatrick- Meuller
Stores Co., Inc. (N.C.) 150 S.E. 356.
Cornwell·v,. S. S. Kresge Co., (W.Va.,), 164
S.E. 156.
Herrick v. Breier, (Ida.) 82 P. (2d) 90.
Thompson v. Y.M.C.A., (Nebr.) 241 N.W. 565.
Russell Vr Liggett Drug Co., Inc., (Tex. Civ.
App.), 153 S.W. (2d) 231.
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Copelan v. Stanley Co. of America, (Pa.), 17
Atl. (2d) 659.
In the case of Vogt v~ lVunnb (Mo.), 300 S.\V. 278,
the plaintiff fell on the steps at the entrance to the defendant's store. The steps had been recently painted
and "·ere covered by boards approximately lit," thick.
The plaintiff had observed the condition of the ste:ps a8
she entered the store, but upon leaving she slipped on
one of the boards which becamB entangled in her legs
and tripped her. A judgment of non-suit was affirmed
by the Supreme Court, which said :
"But in any event whatever danger inhered
in their condition was perfectly obvious. There
was no lurking peril; nothing touching the physi-.
cal situation was hidden or concealed. What
plaintiff saw in going up the steps and upon her
return to come down them disclosed to her all
the information which the proprietors of the
store had touching both their condition and the
care required to use them with safety," (Italics
ours.)
In the case of Lappin v. St. Louis Natl. League Baseball Club, 33 S.W. (2d) 1025, the plaintiff was injured
when shB slipped on a concrete stairway as she was
attempting to leave the grand stand. The plaintiff was
a regular attendant at the baseball games, having attended all of the home games· for three years prior to
the date of the accident. On the date in question the
game had been called on account of wet grounds. She
was leaving the grand stand by the same exit which she
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had always used, which consisted of some 7 or 8 concrete steps. There was water on one of the steps upon
which she slipped and fell.
The treasurer of the defendant corporation testified that in the 12 years he had been connected with the
defendant club there had never been an accident at the
place in question. An expert engineer testified that the
steps had a slight slope which was of standard construction; that every well constructed step in every
building had the same slope and that the steps were
designed in a way that any good architect would design
them.
The plaintiff complained that the defendant was
negligent in maintaining the steps in an uneven condition so that they would retain and hold puddles of water;
in failing to maintain a canopy or cover over the st~p.s;
in failing to prevent the steps from becoming wet; in
failing to remove water after a rain, and in permitting
people to use the stairway while wet. The plaintiff also
complained that no hand rails were provided.
The case was submitted to the jury on the last mentioned allegation of negligence only and resulted in a
verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. In reversing the
judgment, the court said:

"* * • [plaintiff] must have observed the
absence of hand rails and with reference to any
danger arising from the absence of such rails
she was as completely advised as the defendant.
* * * We hold therefore that the case should not
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have been submitted to the jury because of the
absence of hand rails. * * * ''
The court quoted at son1e length frorn Mullen Vr
Sensenbrerwer ~Jere Co., supra, and other cases, and
then said:
"Under the cases above cited, the defendant
was not liable merely because the accident occurred. It was not bound to make the stairway
absolutely safe, but was charged only with the
duty to use ordinary care to maintain it in a
reasonably safe condition. It would be liable
only if the plaintiff, using due care, was injured
by an unsafe condition of the stairway known to
it and not known to the plaintiff. Plaintiff had
been a regular attendant upon the games for a
long period and had used this stairway on such
occasions whether it was raining or not, so she
was as fully advised of the conditions as was the
defendant. Whatever danger attended the use of
the stairway wet with rain which had fallen Uip!On
it was as obvious to her as it was to the defendant.
In this case, as in the Main case supra, there ·is
no evidence that defendant had previously known
of any dangerous condition of the stairway; in
fact, according to the testimony of a witness
who was in a position to know, in the 12 years of
his connection with the Park there had been no
previous accident at this stairway." (Italics
ours.)
In the case of Beitch v. Central Terminal Co., 122
S.W. (2d) 94, the plaintiff was injured when he slipped
and fell as he was leaving the waiting room of the defendant's building. The plaintiff had patronized a resSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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taurant in the defendant's building and he had observed,
when he entered the building, that the floor in the defendant's waiting room was wet for about 6 feet inside
the door, water having been tracked in from the outside.
He again observed this condition as he was leaving. The
plaintiff sued the defendant in negligence for allowing
water to accumulate on the floor, for failure to provide
mats and failure to take other precautions for the health
and safety of the patrons. Said the court:

"* * * [plaintiff] knew that the floor was
W'et and whatever danger existed was obvious;
plaintiff had all the information which the defendant could have had; defendant had no superior knowledge of the perilous condition of the
floor and since, under the Missouri cases cited
supra, superior knowledge on the part of the defendant is held essential to create liability on its
part to the plaintiff as an invitee, plaintiff may
not recover." (Italics added.)
In Cornwell v. 8. 8. Kresge Co., 164 S.E. 156, plaintiff fell and injured herself as she was leaving the defendant's store after having made a purchase there. She
had observed, as she entered the store, that the floor at
and near the entrance was wet from water carried in
by other shoppers and she realized that it was slippery.
A directed verdict for the defendant was affirmed, the
court saying:
''An invitee who uses a damp floor with
knowledge of its condition assumes any risk incidental thereto.''
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In Paubel v. Hitz, ("Jfo.) 96 S.\Y. (2d) 369, a postman was injured when he slipped and fell from a runway leading to the defendant's place of business. The
plaintiff \Yas thoroughly familiar with the runway, having traversed it many times before. It was similar to
runways used by other persons engaged in the same
business in the same vicinity. At the time of the accident the runway was covered with manure and chicken
filth, which was not an unusual condition. A judgment
for the plaintiff was reversed, the court saying:
''According to plaintiff's testimony, the maintenance and use of the runway at defendant's
place of business was common to the commission
houses in the vicinity. No hidden, lurking or
secret peril is involved. Whatever danger existed
was not only obvious, but actually known and appreciated by plaintiff. He possessed all the information concerning the physical condition of
the runway possessed by defendant or his employees and knew of and appreciated the care
required to use the runway. Had he been warned
of the sliAppery condition of the runway, no
greater information would have been imparted to
him than that which he admittedly possessed.''
(Italics added.)
In the case of Thompson v. Y.M.C ..A., (Neb.) 241
N.W. 565 the plaintiff injured herself when she slipped·
on the front steps to the defendant's building as she was
leaving. She had entered the building over the s·ame
steps about five minutes prior to the accident. The steps
were somewhat worn and one of them was wet. In afSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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firming a judgment of non-suit, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska said:
''The authorities generally hold that the risks
which are obvious to a person are assumed by
her where, as in the present case, the relation
was that of owner and invitee or :patron."
In the case of Russell v. Liggett Drug Co .. , Inc., 153
S.W. (2d) 231, the plaintiff's intestate slipped and sustained fatal injuries on a floor which had been waxed
and polished. She had been over the floor a short time
p,rior to the accident. The court said:
''Whatever may have been the condition of
the floor, it was not concealed, but obvious and
plainly to be observed by the injured lady through
walking thereon. From this perspective it is difficult to escape the conclusion of non-liability for
injuries from dangers which are manifest and
were as well known to the injured party as to
the· defendant." (Italics ours.)
The Court also quoted with approval from Ft. Worth
db D. C. R. Co. v. Hambright, {Tex. Civ. App.), 130 S.W.
(2d) 436, 439:

•

''The only conditions under which such an
owner. is liable to those whom he invites upon
his premises are when dangerous and unsafe
instrumentalities or conditions exist, and are
known to him and not known to such invited
persons, and they are injured by such instrumentalities or conditions. It follows that if a person
is injured under such circumstances when the
instrumentality or condition by which he is in-
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jured is as obvious or well known to hiln as it
is to the owner of the premises, no liability exists
for such injury and the law will allow him no
recovery therefor."
In Corley V.- !(roger Grocer & Baking C01npany, 189
S."\V. (2d) 178, the plaintiff fell on a step at the entrance
to defendant's store. The step was of iron which was
worn smooth. It had been snowing and the step was
wet from accumulated snow. Plaintiff had been over
the step many times before. The case was submitted to
the jury on two grounds of negligence: (a) failure to
correct the dangerous condition of the step; and (b)
failure to give· warning of the dangerous condition.
A verdict and judgment for the plaintiff were reversed, the court saying:
"The testimony of plaintiff shows that at the
time of the ·occurrence it was snowing slightly
and the wind was blowing the snow about. The
step in question was outside step where snowflakes would necessarily fall under the conditions
testified to. In view of this evidence we cannot
say that a failure to remove immediately every
snowflake as it fell, or with a blow torch or by
some other means to dry the moisture created
by the film of snow as it fell, could reasonably
be held to be a breach of duty which defendant
owed to plaintiff as an invitee. To so require
would be to demand an exercise of such extraordinary care as would be unreasonable. We are
satisfied that no case for the jury was made under
the assignment of negligence in question. * * *
'' * * * ..A. defendant storekeeper or land owner
is not liable to his business invitee for injuries
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resulting from an open obvious condition, just as
well known to the invitee as it is to the owner. * * *
''Everyone knows that snow is slick and everyone knows that any worn surface is rendered
especially slick by the p1resence thereon of moisture. Due care did not require defendant to warn
plaintiff of these simple facts. She was bound to.
know them .. To require defendant to do so would
be to place upon it an unreasonable burden, a duty
to exercise a higher degree of care than the law
and common sense should require." (Italics added.)
The case of Schnoll v. National Shirt Shops of Missouri, (Mo.), 193 S.W. (2d) 605, is remarkably similar
on its facts to the case at bar. The defendant store in
that case had an entranceway very similar to that of
the Walgreen Drug Company. The floor was of terrazzo.
However, there was on the floor some brass lettering.
The brass was not corrugated and the brass letters protruded slightly above the level of the terrazzo floorway.
There, as here, the plaintiff was wearing Cuban Heels,
but of rubber rather than of leather. Likewise, at the
time she slipped and fell at the entranceway it was
raining and it had been raining for sometime iprior
thereto. As in the case at bar, the plaintiff alleged that
the floor was slippery when wet and that the defendant
was negligent in failing to put out a rubber mat, and
in failing to warn of the dangerous condition. Also
similar to the present case, the entranceway had a slight
incline or slope. Further paralleling the facts in the
case at bar, the evidence showed that prior to the day
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of the accident the defendant had custmnarily had a
rubber mat on the entranreway on rainy days. The evidence there as here, showed that terrazzo was in common
use for entranceways to stores in the locality.
A verdict and judgment for the plaintiff were reversed, the Court saying:
"There is no liability of defendant for injuries
from dangers that are obvious or as well known
to plaintiff as to defendant. * * *
"It is commonly known that a smooth, highly
polished surface is slippery when wet. Under the
circumstances a person of ordinary prudence
would have appreciated the slippery condition of
wet brass lettering so patently disclosed; although
plaintiff did not according to the evidence. In this
connection we are treating more directly with the
legal duty or basis of liability of defendant than
with a question of contributory negligence. Defendant, who is not subject to liability for injuries
resulting from dangers that were obvious, should
not be obliged to antic~pate that its patrons, in the
exercise of ordinary care, would fail to appreciate
dangers generally known to be inherent in conditions that were obvious. * * •
''Defendant was not required to have its premises absolutely safe-defendant was not an insurer
of its patrons' safety." (Italics added.)
In the case of Copelan v. Stanley Co. of America,
(Pa.), 17 Atl. (2d) 659, the plaintiff slipped on a terrazzo step to a theatre. The step was somewhat worn.
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In reversing the verdict and judgment for the plaintiff
the Court said:
''The charge of negligence in this case has
not been sustained. The material of which the
step was constructed was reasonably suitable for
the purpose and was one in common use.''
Another leading case on this same question which
has found extensive support from the Courts of other
jurisdictions, is the case of 8. 8. Kresge Co. v. Fader,
116 0. St. 718, 158 N.E. 174. The facts of that case are
similar to those in the case at bar. The plaintiff slipped
at the entranceway to the defendant's store. It w:1s
raining at the time and as in the instant case, other
patrons of the store had tracked water into the store.
Some rain had also been blown in when the door was
open. There, as here, the plaintiff charged that the defendant was negligent in failing to put out a rubber
mat and in failing to warn customers of the wet floor. In
holding the defendant not liable, the Supreme Court of
Ohio said:
"It is a fact known to all that many stores
in all branches of trade have an inside door or
passageway into the store, usually in the middle
of the front. On each side of this passageway
then extends back ten or twelve feet or more to
the entrance door to the store. The passage
usually has a slight slope from the door to the
sidewalk, at which line there is no door. This
slope is to carry away the rain that may blow
into the passageway. The passageway is in fact
practically a :part of the sidewalk, but at the
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same tinw it is within the front line of the store,
and under control of the store. TVo1rld any one
contend that, if a person walked into such passagetray tchen it u·as raining, and there slipped and
fell, he cottld recover damages because there
teas moisture on .the floor of tl1c passageway?
J.llanifestly not. EYerybody knmvs that, when
people are entering any building when it is raining, they will carry some moisture on their feet,
which will render the floor near the door on the
inside damp to some extent, and every one knows
that a damp floor is likely to be a little more
slippery than a dry floor. In this instance Mrs.
Fader knew that her own shoes were wet when
she went in there out of the rain storm, and after
walking on the west sidewalk. * * *
"01\"'llers or lessees of stores, office buildings,
banks, hotels, theaters, or other buildings where
the public is invited to come on business or pleasure, are not insurers against all forms of accidents
that may happen to any who come. Everybody
knows that the hallways between the outside doors
of such buildings and the elevators or business
counters inside the building during a continued
rain storm are tracked all over by the wet feet
of people coming from the wet sidewalks, and are
thereby rendered more slippery than they otherwise would be. The same thing is true in the hallways of all postoffices. It is not the duty of persons in control of such buildings to keep a large
force of mappers to mop up the rain as fast as it
falls or blows in, or is carried in by wet feet or
clothing or umbrellas, for several very good reasons, all so obvious that it is wholly unnecessary
to mention them here in detail,
It should be borne in mind that this accident
did not happen, in some dark walkway in the store
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where the shopper found it necessary to go. It
occurred in broad daylight, and there is no pretense that there was anything · to prevent any
shopper from seeing and knowing precisely what
the conditions were.

"Not every accident that occurs gives rise to
a cause of action upon which the party injured
may recover damages from some one. Thousands
of accidents occur every day for which no one is
liable in damages, and often no one is to blame,
not even the ones who are injured. The character
or extent of an injury has no bearing upon the
question of the liability therefor; neither has the
wealth nor the poverty of either party to such a
litigation anything to do with the question of
liability for the accident.
''There is no evidence in this case tending to
prove, much less proving, that the Kresge Company was guilty of negligence in any particular
as charged by Mrs. Fader in her vetition. The
trial court should have granted the motions of
counsel for the Kresge Company for a directed
verdict in its favor. Failing in this, the Court of
Appeals should have reversed the judgment of
the trial court and entered final judgment for
the Kresge Company.
''The judgments of both courts will be reversed and final judgment entered here in favor
o:f the plaintiff in error." (Italics added.)
A few of the many cases which have cited or quoted
from the above quoted case, with approval, are as follows:

Picman v. Higbee Co., (0. App.), 6 N.E.
(2d) 21.
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Dahnke

l'.

HHnt, (0. App.), 8 N.E. (2d) 838.

Plotner v. Gt. Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., (0. App.),
18 N.E. (2d) 409.
Englehardt v. Phillips, (0. St.), :.?3 N.E. (2d)
829.
Krans v. W. T. Grant Co., (0. App.), 82 N.E.
(2d) 544.
Sears, Roeb~t.ek &; Co. v. Johnson, 91 Fed.
(2d) 332.
Murray v. Bedell Co. of Chicago, 256 Ill. App.
247.
Parsons v. H. L. Green Co. Inc., (Ia.), 10
N.W. (2d) 40.
Lawson v. D. H. Holmes Co. Ltd., (La.), 200
So. 163.
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Lamberson, 144
Fed. (2d) 97.
Lander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., (Me.), 44
Atl. (2d) 886.
Bersch v.. Holton St. State Bank, (Wis.) 19
N.W. (2d) 175.
Shumaker v. Charada Investment Co.,
(Wash.), 49 P. (2d) 44.
Knopp v. Kemp & Hebert, (Wash.), 74 P. ·
(2d) 924.
In Plotner v. Gt. Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 18 N.E. (2d)
409, the plaintiff slipped on an oil spot in defendant's
parking lot. She was familiar with the lot, having used
it for 7 years prior to the accident and she knew that
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there was frequently oil on the lot. In reversing a judgment for the ;plaintiff, the court said:
"The appellant was not required continually
to place a guard or employee to warn parking
customers of that which was as 1plainly visible
to the one as to the other. In the instant case
the evidence warranted the conclusion that Mrs.
Plotner assumed the risk of the plainly evident
condition of which she complains. It was broad
daylight and, according to her own story, she
knew the recurring condition of the parking space
from oil which fell from the cars continually
parked there. How long the particular oil spot
had existed no one knows, nor from what automobile it fell; but this much is known, the oil was
not there by any act of appellant and the parking
space had been washed and scrubbed on the
morning of the day that Mrs. Plotner was injured
at 5 :30 in the afternoon.''
In Englehardt v. Phillips, 23 N.E. (2d) 829, the
court said:
''The specific question here involved is whether
the defendant set up an unreasonable risk as to
the plaintiff by maintaining a diving tower, the
platform of which was slippery when wet. Similar
questions have frequently been before the courts
involving the risks incident to the use of areas
and surfaces upon which persons are invited to go
while such areas or surfaces are in a slippery
condition,' because of the presence of rain or
other natural forms of moisture. These cases
are distinguishable from others in which the
negligence charged relates to some extraneous
substance which has been placed upon or allowed
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to accumulate upon commercial areas frequented
by pedestrians, causing such area to become
slippery and dangerous. * * *
Because of the impracticability of avoiding the
presence of moisture on such commercial surfaces
and areas as commonly used and maintained,
especially when located out of doors or within the
·entrances of building structures, the law generally
declines to fix liability against those creating or
maintaining such surfaces or areas in favor of
those u'lw slip and fall thereon." (Italics ours.)

In the case of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson, 91
Fed. (2d) 332, the plaintiff slipped on a wet floor where
water had been tracked in from the outside by other
patrons of the store. In denying the recovery the court
said:
"If what was shown in this case was sufficient
to permit recovery it would require store owners
to have a mopper stationed at the doors on rainy
days for the sole purpose of mopping up after
every customer entering or leaving the premises.
Every store owner would be required to be an
insurer against such accidents to public invitees
who came in on rainy days with wet shoes."
The facts of Murray v~ Bedell Co. of Chicago, 256
Ill. App. 247, are very similar to those in the case at bar.
In denying recovery, the court said:
"In the case at bar the plaintiff was as well
apprised of the condition existing in the vestibule
as the defendant and should be held to as high
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a degree of care for her own safety as would be
required of the defendant.''
The Supreme Court of Iowa used the following
language in denying recovery in another case similar to
the case at bar :
"We cannot say that a failure to follow and
remove immediately every deposit of snow that
is brought into a building can reasonably be held
to be a breach of duty which the inviter owes to
an invitee and constitutes negligence. Such is
not the holding of the courts where this question
has arisen. To so require would demand an exercise of such extraordinary care as to be unreasonable.
''Cases cited by defendant sustain this view
and follow the general rule as to situations such
as are here shown to have existed, temporary in
character and produced by agencies over which
the inviter has no control." Parsons v. H. L.
Green Co. Inc., (Ia.), 10 N. W. (2d) 40.
In Lawson v. D. H. Holmes Co. Ltd., (La.), 200 So.
163, the plaintiffs' intestate sustained fatal injuries in
a fall at the entrance to defendant's store. The entranre
consisted of a step covered with scored cast-iron plate
and a platform of tile bordered with glazed tile. The
slope of the platform was about 4% and the slope of
the iron tread was about 8%. At the time of the accident the entrance was wet from rain. An expert architect testified that the passageway was not properly
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constructed, but admitted that the type of construcion
was not unusual in that locality, though not of the most
modern design. The iron tread was quite badly worn.
Defendant's evidence showed that the entrance had
been in use many years prior to the accident; that thousands of people walked over it daily and there had never
been a complaint with respect to its condition and no
accident ever had occurred there before. The trial court
ordered the complaint dismissed and the judgment was
affirmed. The court said :

'' * "'• we have no hesitancy in concluding that
the district judge was correct in holding that the
defendant was without fault and therefore is not
responsible for the unfortunate accident. The
well established jurisprudence of this state with
respect to the duty owed by a storekeeper to his
rp·atrons is that he is not an insurer of their safety.
He need not keep his place and passageways in
perfect condition, but must exercise only ordinary
care and prudence to keep them in reasonably
safe condition for his customers. * * *
"The defendant's testimony showed that thousands of people walk over this slab each day;
that they have been doing so for many years;
that there have been no complaints and no other
accident has ever occurred. This to our minds is
a strong circumstance which must be considered
by us in determining the condition of the step.
* * * Then, too, it is shown that there is nothing
uncommon or exceptional about the use of an
iron slab over a step to protect it and that the
steps of many buildings situated in New Orleans
are provided with similar coveoring.
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''The accident occurred in broad daylight and
is one which can and does frequently happen
without the slightest fault on the part of anyone.
The fact that it had been raining and that the
vestibule was wet undoubtedly caused the passageway to be slippery, but this of itself cannot be
plausibly advanced by plaintiffs as an argument
to hold the defendant liable for their mother's
death. On the contrary, Mrs. Lawson knew that
it was raining and she is to be charged with
knowledge of the fact that one is apt to slip
upon any wet surface. On this point we find ourselves in absolute accord with the views expressed
by the Supreme Court of Ohio in S. S. Kresge
Co. v. Fader * * * '' Lengthy quotation from
Kresge case omitted. (Italics ours.)
In Lander v. Sears Roebuck & Co., (Me.) 44 Atl.
(2d) 886, the plaintiff slipped on a wet spot in defendant's store which was caused by customers tracking in
rain water from the outside. A directed verdict for the
defendant was affirmed, the court saying:
''This case * * * present the single issue
whether a storekeeper is negligent in permitting
customers to enter a store having a floor which
becomes slippery when weather conditions are
such that water or moisture will be tracked in
upon their footwear without 1protecting them from
the hazard of slipping by the use of mats or
other rna terials under such circumstances or by
keeping the floor dry through mopping. A wet
floor inevitably results when rain or snow is
falling or the ground outside is covered with
melting snow. * • •
''There is no evidence that the defendant knew
or should ~ave known that the condition of its
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floor was hazardous, or that any foreign substances other than that which every customer
entering, including the plaintiff, was tracking in,
increased the hazard caused by moisture alone.
There is no evidence that the floor was more
slippery than it would have been if surfaced
·with any material standard for use as the flooring in a mercantile establishment in the locality.
* * * The defendant was doing business on a
day when the conditions of nature outside and
the entry of customers into its store necessarily
carried moisture on to the floor. It cannot be
said on the evidence contained in the record that
its agents or servants were not exercising reasonable care to guard its customers against any risk
which was known to them or should have been
foreseen by them. It was proper to direct a
verdict for the defendant."
In Shumaker v. Charada Inv. Co., 49 P. (2d) 44,
the plaintiff was injured when she slipped on the wet
cement floor of defendant's market. She had visited the
market on many prior occasions and the evidence established that the floor of the market was frequently wet.
In holding defendant not liable, the Supreme Court of
Washington said :
"We are of the op1n1on that no primary
negligence was in this case proven against appellant. Assuming that ap}}·ellant knew that
water was frequently splashed upon the cement
floors of the market, and that these floors were
often damp or even wet, it cannot be held that
a wet cement floor constitutes such a dangerous
condition as to hold the owner maintaining the
same responsible as for negligence to one who
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slipped thereon. A wet cement surface ~oes not
create a condition dangerous to pedestnans. It
is a most common condition, and one readily
noticed by the most casual glance.''
See also Hogan v. Metro1politan Bldg. Co., et al.
(Wash.) 206 P. 959.
Another case of striking similarity to the case at
bar is J(nopp v. J(emp & Hebert, (Wash.) 74 P. (2d)
924. The facts of that case, as stated in the opinion of

the Court, are as follows:

'' • • * The entrance door of the store on the
Main Avenue side is set back from the sidewalk
about fifteen feet, and the strip of floor between
the front wall of the store and the sidewalk is
used as an arcade for the display of goods in
glass enclosed areas, so arranged as to leave
three open passages for entrance to the arcade
area and the entrance door. The floor of the
arcade is terrazzo, a composition mainly of
cement and marble chips. It slopes slightly from
the entrance door to the sidewalk, but so slightly
that we think that fact of little or no importance.
The sidewalk in front of the store is of the ordinary, familiar cement mixture. Along the inside
of the sidewalk where it joins the terrazzo, row!i'
of small blocks of glass about two inches square
:are set in the cement, a type of construction with
which everyone is familiar. * • *
''It is alleged that the terrazzo floor is very

smoo~h and _becomes exceedingly slippery when

wet, Is dark In color, and, when wet and tracked

oye~ by _people entering the store, becomes so

Similar In appearance to the cement sidewalk
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that the ordinary person entering the arcade
would not observe that he was passing from one
type of floor to another, and for this reason the
place presented a pitfall or trap to persons using
the entrance in the manner for which it was
designed and intended. * * • ''
With respect to the condition of the floor, an architect testified as follows:
'' 'This floor has an exceedingly smooth sur~
face and would be suitable for inside floors, I
would say, in my opinion it is too smooth a surface to be used for ramps or too smooth to be
used for ramps or outside terrazzo work. According to good practice for designing or constructing
all terrazzo floors for exterior, we add an anti-slip
mixture to the terrazzo. And for floors of this
type it required an added mixture of anti-slip
material or abrasive such as carborundum or
alundum in the proportions of about two hundred
pounds of this material to three hundred pounds
of marble chips.'
"Mr. Rasque further testified that he examined
the floor by looking at it, feeling of it, and rubbing
his feet over it, but that he had made no analysis
to determine the proportion of abrasive material
in its construction; that the adjoining sidewalk
was of a float finish cement, not very slippery;
and that, although the glass insets would be
slippery when wet, the intervening strips of
cement between the glass blocks would tend to
prevent sl1pping.''

It appeared that plaintiff fell 1n the entranceway
when it was wet from having water tracked in over it.
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Plaintiff was thoroughly familiar with the entranceway,
having traversed it many times before.
On these facts the Court directed a verdict for the
defendant which was affirmed on appeal. The court
quoted at length from S. S. Kresge Co. v. Fader, supra,
and concluded as follows:
"Walking, although it becomes automatic by
long practice and use, is, after all, a highly co~
plicated process. The body balance is maintained
by the co-ordination of many muscles, and their
operation is controlled by an intricate system of
motor nerves, the failure of any of which for a
split second, on account of advancing age or for
some other reason, may cause a fall. It is common
knowledge that people fall on the best of sidewalks
and floors. A fall, therefore, does not, of itself,
tend to prove that the surface over which one is
walking is dangerously unfit for the purpose.
''Appellant contends, however, that cases of
the type hereinbefore cited do not fully cover the
circumstances of the case at bar. It is argued
thai the situation presented a trap for the unwary,
since the terrazzo surface was more slippery
than the adjoining sidewalk, and the junction of
the two surfaces was obscured by slush or muddy
water so that one entering the store could not
determine where the sidewalk ended and the
terrazzo began. But it would seem that one
entering the store could not help but see the broad
terrazzo surface of the arcade and would naturally conclude that it extended to the sidewalk line.
At all events, the appellant would naturally proceed very carefully in passing over the wet, glassstudded sidewalk. She testified that she did so,
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and what further precaution could or would she
have taken had she noticed the exact line of
demarcation between the sidewalk and the terrazzo~ We see nothing in the circumstances of
the case to bring it within the rule of such cases
as Short v. Spokane, 41 Wash. :257, 83 P. 183, and
Tyler Y. 'Yoolworth Co., supra.''
The same principles have also been followed by the
California Courts. In Mautino v. Sutter Hospital Ass'n.,
(Cal. App.), 285 P. 369, the plaintiff, a nurse, slipped
and fell on a waxed and polished floor in a room of the
hospital. She was familiar with the room, having been
in it before, and she had observed, prior to the accident,
that the floor ·was slippery. A judgment for the plaintiff
was reversed, the court quoting from 20 RrC.L. pages
55-57 as follows :

'' * * * The owner is not an insurer of such
persons, even when he has invited them to enter.
Nor is there any presumption of negligence on
the part of an owner or occupier merely upon a
showing that an injury has been sustained by
one while rightfully upon the premises. The true
ground of liability is the ~roprietor 's superior
knowledge of the perilous instrumentality and
the danger therefrom to persons going upon the
property. It is when the perilous instrumentality
is known to the owner or occupant and not to
the person injured that a recovery is permitted.
* * * There is no liability for injuries from
dangers that are obvious or as well known to
the person injured as to the owner or occupant."
On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, the
above cited case was affirmed and the opinion of the
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Court of Appeals adopted as the opinion of the Supreme
Court. Mautino v. Sutter Hospital Ass'n., (Cal.) 296 P.
78.

The principles laid down in those cases were reaffirmed in the case of Neil v. Bank of America National
Trust & Savings Ass'n., (Cal. App.), 104 P. (2d) 107.
In that case a bank customer slipped on wet linoleum
which had been made wet by customers tracking in mud
and rain water from the outside. In reversing a judg·ment for the plaintiff, the court made the following
statement:
''In the case of Crawford v. Pacific States
S. & L. Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 448, 449, 71 P. 2d
333, it was stated, quoting from Touhy v. Owl
Drug Co., 6 Cal. App. 2d 64, 66, 44 P. 2d 405:
'' 'The proprietor of buildings who directly
or by implication invites others to go therein
owes to such persons who thus enter a duty to
have his premises in a reasonably safe condition,
and to give warning of latent or concealed perils.
He is not an insurer of such persons, nor does
the mere occurrence of injury on such premises
to such invitee create any presumption of negligence on the part of the proprietor. His responsibility is not absolute; he is only required to
use ordinary care for the safety of the persons
he invites to come upon the premises. The true
ground of liability rests on the proprietor's
superior knowledge of the perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to invitees, over
that of the invitee. Where such danger is obvious, or is as well known to the injured invitee as
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to the owner or occupant, there is no liability.'
[Citing numerous cases.]
"The general rule is stated in 25 Corpus
Juris, 837, Sec. 245 : 'In order to impose liability for injury to an invitee by reason of the
dangerous condition of the premises the conditions must have been known to the owner or
occupant or have existed for such time that it
was the duty of the owner or occupant to know
of it.' Citing the California case, Shanley v.
American Olive Co., 185 Cal. 552, 197 P. 793."
Another case closely similar on its facts to the case
at bar is Cestario v. Pennsylvania .Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
49 F. Supp. 1004 (1943). In that case it appeared that
plaintiff, a prospective passenger, on one of defendant's
busses, slipped and fell on a terrazzo floor of the lobby
of defendant's bus station. The lobby floor was level
with and open to the sidewalk. It was covered to the line
of the sidewalk by an upper floor of the building. At
the time of her arrival at the station it was drizzling,
and it had been raining. Although plaintiff noticed that
the sidewalk was wet, she did not notice that the lobby
floor was in the same condition. As she entered she
slipped and fell on a spot which, after she had fallen,
she noticed was wet. At the time an iron mesh rug was
on the floor in front of a door, but at the point of plaintiff's entrance no rug or abrasive substance was upon
the floor. There was evidence that the floor would be
slippery when wet. Defendant moved for a judgment
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for it notwithstanding the verdict, which motion was
allowed, the court saying :
"In our judgment the maintenance of a terrazzo floor in a lobby, such as is shown in the instant case and which is open to the entry of rain
under certain conditions, without mats or sand
when wet does not constitute negligence; and it is
the duty of one entering upon such a lobby to
observe and care for conditions following the
entry of rain upon it."
In the case of Bridgeford v_ Stewart Dry Goods Co.,
191 Ky. 557, 231 S.W. 22, plaintiff sli•prped and fell on
a wet floor in the basement of defendant's store. The
wetness was caused ~y an unusual rain storm. The plaintiff had observed that the floor was wet. She alleged
negligence against the defendant in that the floor was
slick and slippery and that the defendant failed to post
warning notices and barricades. The Court affirmed a
directed verdict for the defendant, saying:
"Hence she [plaintiff] knew of the very condition which she claims rendered the floor unsafe
and her accident was not the result of defendant's failure to give her notice or warning, even
if it be conceded that ordinary care required
notice that an ordinary wood floor in a well
lighted room was moist or damp, which is at
least doubtful. • * • Certain it is that the mere
fact the floor was moist or damp did not render
it so dangerous as to require of defendant in
the exercise of ordinary care for the safety of
its customers that it should place barricades
across the entrance of the basement and prevent
its use altogether until the floor was entirely
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dried out. We are inclined to the op1n10n that
proof simply that an ordinary wood floor in a
well lighted room is moist or damp is no evidence
that it is not in a reasonably safe condition for
use, but if mistaken in that we are quite sure
that one who uses such a floor with full knowledge
of its condition assumes any and all risks incident to its use."
The New York courts have followed the principles
laid down by the above cited cases. See Miller v. Gimbel
Bros. Inc., 262 N.Y. 107, 186 N.E. 410, and Antenen v.
New York Telephone Co., (N.Y.), 2 N.E. (2d) 693.
We can close our argument on this point in no better
way than by a reference to the recent case of Dudley v,
Montgomery Ward & Co., (Wyo.), 192 P. (2d) 617. The
facts of that case are quite similar to those in the case
at bar. The plaintiff was injured when she slipped on a
wet spot in the defendant's store. There was snow and
slush on the sidewalks, some of which had been tracked
into defendant's store by other patrons. The plaintiff
was walking her usual gait, or perhaps just a little fast,
when she entered the store. Her shoes were wet. At the
time of the accident the .plaintiff was 58 years old.
A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed. The
opinion of the Court is lengthy and carefully reviews
many of the cases cited in this brief and also many
others treating the same question. After a careful review of the authorities, the court said:

"• "' * we cannot perceive that if it be claimed
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tion of her wet shoes and the slush and water
tracked in by the store's customers, there could
be predicated thereon any failure on defendant's
part to perform a duty which it owed to plaintiff. Nor could a jury [Jvroperly find the defendant
guilty of negligence in that respect. It cannot be
the law that under the temporary weather conditions prevalent on September 27, 1945, a storekeeper must at his peril keep his floors absolutely
dry or maintain a force of mappers to follow
every customer who enters the store. That would
be wnreasonable and even impossible for most
store owners. It would seem decidedly significant
in the case before us that although she saw that
the defendant's store floor inside the door used
by the plaintiff was slippery with slush and water,
she walked 'a little fast' through it and fell.''
(Italics added.)
In summary, it may be observed that in most of the
cases above cited, the facts were stronger for the plaintiff than in the case at bar. In many of the cases the
slope of the entranceway was greater than in the instant case. In some of the cases there was expert testimony that the entranceway was not of sound construction, whereas in the instant case, the expert testimony
is to the effect that the construction employed was the
safest type known to the industry. In some of the above
cases the plaintiff had never been on the premises before, whereas here the plaintiff had traversed the same
entranceway many times before. .Also in some of the
above cases there was a question of improper lighting;
there is no such question here. Further, in many of
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hers, or rubber-heeled shoes, whereas here, the plaintiff
was wearing leather heeled shoes, which were worn on
the outside, and on which the nails were worn, forming
a hard, smooth surface.
We also think that it is of significance that in nearly
all of these cases, the ~plaintiff was a woman, generally
of advanced years. Assumedly, she would be wearing
"built-up heels." A woman wearing high heels should
have some duty to walk with care for her own safety,
particularly when traversing a wet, smooth surface. And
the Courts have uniformly denied recovery where the
plaintiff, having observed and being fully cognizant oi
the situation, has fallen on an entranceway made wet
and slick by rain; or by water being tracked in by
other store patrons. As has been pointed out so well,
in the opinions of many of the Courts, to hold the storekeeper liable under such circumstances would be to hold
him to an insurer's liability, and to cast upon him a
burden of care almost impossible to discharge.
The evidence in this case conclusively establishes
that the entranceway was constructed in accordance with
the highest standards of safety known to the construction industry. Any hazard which may have temporarily
existed at the time of plaintiff's accident, due to the
wetness of the floor caused by rainwater being tracked
in by other patrons, was open and obvious, and was
recognized by the plaintiff. There was no duty on the
part of the defendant to give warning of such condition, or to put out rubber mats. To permit this judgSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ment to stand, would cast upon storekeepers in general
an impossible burden of care. The judgment should be
reversed with directions to enter a judgment in favor
of defendant, no cause of action.
POINT II. THE VERDICT IS INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE INSTRUCTIONS
OF THE COURT AND IS
AGAINST LAW.

The negligence relied upon by the plaintiff as
grounds of recovery against the defendants as stated
in paragraph 5 of plaintiff's amended complaint (R. 34)
is as follows:
(a) That the entranceway was constructed with a
slight grade and of a material which was smooth and
polished and when wet became slick and slippery.
(b) That the defendants failed to give appropriate
warning to the ;plaintiff of the dangerous condition and
failed to cover the entranceway with mats or with other
material to make it safe.
With respect to the dangerous construction of the
entranceway, the Court instructed the jury as follows:
(Instruction No. 8.)
"You are instructed that the defendant Salisbury Investment Company constructed the entranceway to the Walgreen Drug Company store
where plaintiff fell and had the exclusive right
to change the entranceway and material from
. which said entranceway was constructed; and if
you find from'· a prerponderance of the evidence
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that said entranceway was not constructed or
maintained in a reasonably 8afe manner in that
when wet the entranceway became slick, slippery,
and not reasonably safe to walk upon, and that
the Salisbury Investment Company knew or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known
of said condition, then the Salisbury Investment
was negligent; and if you find by a preponderance
of the evidence that such negligence proximately
caused injuries to plaintiff, then your verdict
should be for plaintiff and against defendant
Salisbury Investment Company unless the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. (R. 71.) (Italics
added.)

With respect to the duty to give warning of the
dangerous condition and the duty to cover the entranceway with mats or other materials, the Court instructed
the jury as follows: (Instruction No. 10.)
"You are instructed that it was the duty of
defendant Walgreen Drug Company to exercise
reasonable care to keep the entranceway to its
store reasonably safe for the use of its customers;
and in this regard you are instructed that if you
shall find from a preponderance of t.he evidence
that the entranceway was not reasonably safe in
that the floor of the entranceway had become wet
from rain water and slick and slippery and that
defendant Walgreen Drug Company knew or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known
of said condition, and failed to exercise reasonable care to remedy said condition and make said
entranceway reasonably safe for the use of its
customers, by means of warning signs to advise
of the slick condition or by covering the terrazzo
entrance with rubber mats or other substances
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to prevent slipping, then the Walgreen Drug
Company was negligent; and if such negligence
proximately caused injuries to plaintiff, then
your verdict should be for plaintiff and against
defendant Walgreen Drug Company, unless plaintiff was contributorily negligent. (R. 72.) (Italics
added.)
It is apparent from a reading of these instructions
that the Court was of the opinion, and so instructed the
jury, that only the defendant Salisbury Investment
Company could be liable for the dangerous construction
of the entranceway. However, if the entranceway were
negligently or dangerously constructed, then this defendant would be guilty of negligence if it failed to give
appropriate warning of the dangerous condition, or to
take steps to eliminate the dangerous condition, with
a covering material of some sort. As a prerequisite to
a finding that the defendant was guilty of negligence,
it would be necessary for the jury to find that the Salisbury Investment Company was guilty of negligence.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant Salisbury Investment Company and against the
plaintiff, no cause of action. By this general verdict the
jury found in effect that the entranceway to the defendant's store was not dangerous. However, the jury returned a verdict in favor of ~he plaintiff and against
this defendant in the sum of $8,000.00. The verdict as
against this defendant is wholly inconsistent with the
verdict in favor of the defendant Salisbury Investment
Company. In the one case the jury finds that there is no
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dangerous condition. In the other case the jury finds
that this defendant was negligent for failure to give
warning of the dangerous condition, or for failing to
remedy it. If there was no dangerous condition, as the
jury found in regard to Salisbury Investment Company,
how can this defendant be guilty of negligence for
failure to warn of the dangerous condition or failure
to remedy the same~ It is quite a;pparent that the verdict is a sympathetic one and not based on any reason
or logic-on the contrary it is wholly illogical and un.
reasonable, and based on wholly inconsistent findings.
The verdicts as between the two defendants to this
case are inconsistent with each other and the verdict as
against this defendant is contrary to the instructions of
the Court. The instructions of the Court, unexcepted to
by counsel, are the law of the case, and whether right
or wrong the jury is bound to follow them. See in this
connection :

Baron v. Botsford, (Mont.) 90 P. (2d) 510.
Rodgers v. Berger, (Ariz.) 103 P. (2d) 266.
That a verdict must be consistent, is a principle
which has generally been assumed to exist, but which
seems to have rarely required a judicial affirmation.
The cases treating this question seem to be few and
far between. 53 Am. Jur. 725, Trial, Sec. 1048. Yet plain
logic and common sense would seem to require the existence of such a principle. It would be a monstrous rule
which would permit a jury to decide a case according
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to its sympathies, without any regard to facts, law, or
logic. While we recognize that the law is not logic, and
not always logical, it should not necessarily be illogical,
and it should not depart from the rules of logic in the
absence of sound and compelling reasons for so doing.
No good reason occurs to us why the jury should
be permitted to play fast and loose with the rights of
litigants as was done in this case. The conclusion i::;
irresistable that the verdict in this case is a sympathetic
one. We cannot know what reasoning prompted the jury
to exonerate one of two corporate defendants. Assumedly the jury concluded that the entranceway was jproperly constructed and was not hazardous. Having so
found, it should not be permitted to fasten damages
upon this defendant for failure to give warning of a
dangerous condition which didn't exist, or failure to
remedy a dangerous condition which didn't exist.
In the case of Nelson v. Duquesne Light Company,
338 Pa. 37, 12 A. (2d) 299, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was confronted with a somewhat similar problem. In that case plaintiff's husband had been killed
while riding as a guest passenger in an automobile
driven by the defendant Messinger. The defendant Messinger had collided with a utility pole which had been
erected approximately in the center of the highway by
the defendant Duquesne Light Company pursuant to
permission granted by the defendant City of Pittsburgh.
The plaintiff commenced an action against all defendants for the death of her husband. The jury returned
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a verdict against the City and in favor of the plaintiff,
but in favor of the defendant utility company and
against the plaintiff. The Court held in that case that
"the verdict against the city as a defendant and in
favor of the light com:pany as a defendant is, on the
facts of this case, inconsistent,'' and ordered the judgment set aside and ordered a new trial. The Court went
on to say:
"When the case is tried again, the trial judge
should make it clear to the jury that the liability,
if any, of the City of Pittsburgh, is only secondary to the liability, if any, of the Duquesne Light
Company, and while, if the facts warrant it, a
sustainable verdict could be rendered against
both the city and the Light Company, a sustainable verdict could not be rendered against the
city if the Light Company is exculpated."
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING DEFENDANT'S PROFERRED TESTIMONY TO THE EFFECT
THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO ACCIDENTS AT THE
PLACE IN QUESTION DURING THE 15 YEARS PRIOR TO
THE TRIAL EXCEPT THE ACCIDENT INVOLVING THIS
PLAINTIFF.

As is pointed out in the statement of facts herein
contained, the defendant offered to prove by the testimony of Mr. Conley, the manager of defendant's store,
that approximately 4000 to 5000 people per day came
into its store and that in the past fourteen or fifteen
years, it had never come to the attention of the defendant that anyone had ever slipped on the terrazzo entranceway, either when it was wet or dry. On objection
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by the plaintiff, this offer of proof was rejected by the
Court. A similar offer of proof made by the defendant,
Salisbury Investment Company was also excluded. In
refusing to admit this proferred evidence, the Court
committed prejudicial error ..
The general rule, as stated in 1 Shearman & Redfield
on Negligence, 168, Sec. 59, is as follows:
"The fact that [)remises or appliances have
been used for many years by many persons, without injury, or that no evidence was produced
that any other person than the plaintiff had been
injured, is a strong circumstance in disproof of
negligence in the use of such premises or appliances. It is error to exclude testimony that there
had been no prior complaints of a dangerous condition.''
Some Courts have gone so far as to hold, that such
t{>roof is conclusive of the question. We do not here
contend that such proof would be conclusive on the
question of negligence, but we do contend that such
proof is admissible and is entitled to strong weight in
determining the question of negligence or non-negligence on the part of this defendant.
The case of Mullen v. Sensenbrenner Mere. Co.
(Mo.) 260 S.W. 982, has heretofore been cited and discussed at some length. In that case, evidence that the
defendant's entranceway had been in use for a period
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of about four years; that thousands of people had
passed over it, and that no other person had ever been
injured by slipping or other·wise, was held to be conclusive proof that the entranceway was not unreasonably unsafe. Said the Court :
''As to whether the tile was so slick as to be
dangerous: Defendant's evidence is that the tile
floor was put down in 1915, and this accident
happened four years afterward, and that in the
meantime thousands of people must have passed
over it before plaintiff was injured, and also
after !plaintiff was injured, up to the time of the
trial, and that no other person was injured thereon by slipping or otherwise, although it was always in the same condition as when plaintiff was
injured. Such evidence conclusively shows that
said tile was not so slick, or said entrance so
sloping, or the crack therein so large or of such
character as not to be reasonably safe, without
rugs or sawdust or any other covering thereon."
(Italics added.)
·
In the case of Lappin v. St. Louis National League
Baseball Club, 33 S.W. (2d) 1025, heretofore cited and
discussed, the Court said:
''In this case, as in the Main case, supra,
there is no evidence that defendant had previously known of any dangerous condition of the
stairway; in fact, according to the testimony of
a witness who was in a position to know, in the
twelve years of his connection with the park
there had been no previous accident at this stairway."
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In the case of City of Drumright v. Moore, (Okla.),
170 Pac. (2d) 230, the Court said:
"The undisputed testimony is, that it, [the
entranceway] had existed as a part of the building for some 25 years during which time a large
number of people had passed through the doorway without sustaining any injury because of its
location. This is strong, if not conclusive evidence, that its maintenance in the doorway by
the city was not negligence."
In the case of State Planters Bank and Trust Company v. Gans, (Va.), 200 S.E. 591, plaintiff was injured
while entering defendant's bank building. In that case
the evidence showed, that more than six hu.ndred persons had used the entranceway daily for more than
eleven years prior to the time of trial, and that during
that time, the :plaintiff was the only person known to
have been injured on the steps. The Court held, that
such proof was practically conclusive that the steps
were reasonably safe, quoting with approval from the
case of Mullen v. Sensenbrenner Mere .Co., supra.
In the case of Haleem v. Gold, 164 N.Y.S. 119, the
plaintiff was injured on an entrance platform in front
of the defendant's store. The entrance platform had
been in use for twenty-five years prior to that time, and
during that time, no person had ever been injured by
using it. It was held that the defendant had no reason
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to suppose that such entrance platform would suddenly
become a source of danger.
Said the Court :
''Several hundred people walk over it every
day and during the twenty-five years of its use,
no one ever heard of an injury. I find here no
basis for a charge of negligence. Defendant had
no reason to suppose that a platform used in
safety for so many years, would suddenly become a source of danger and it is familiar law
that one cannot be chargeable with negligence
who has no notice or means of notice that a thing
maintained by him can be the cause of injury."
In Tryon v. Chalmers, 205 App. Div. 816, 200 N.Y.S.
362, the Court said:

''As a general rule, where a structure, not
obviously dangerous, has been in daily use for
years, as had this stairway in question, and has
uniformly been safe, its use may be continued
without the imputation of culpable imprudence
and carelessness. Lafflin v. B. & S. R. R. Co., 106
N. Y. 136, 141, 12 N.E. 599, 60 Am. Rep. 433. It
is not shown that there had ever been an accident on this stairway before. The· fact that
scores of customers have used this stairway daily
for years was potent assurance to these defendants that it was reasonably safe. There was no
duty resting upon the defendants which required
that they so provide for the safety of customers
that they shall meet no danger when on the
premises. The defendants are not insurers of
their customers' safety.''
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In DeSalvo v. Stanley-Mark-Strand Conporation (N.
Y.) 23 N.E. (2d) 457, following a long line of earlier
New York Cases, the Court, speaking through Crane,
Chief Justice, said :
"\Yhen a well known architect constructs a
theatre in accordance with the approval of the
building department, and also similar to like
classes of structures, and the theatre as built has
been safe in constant use for many years, the
mere fact of the happening of an accident, is not
sufficient to cast responsibility for faulty construction upon the owners. * * * The theatre had
a capacity of 2,758 peo:ple. It had been operating
for 23 years at the time of the accident, during
the course of which hundreds of thousands of
men, women and children passed by the opening
and railing without mishap. As stated before,
there was no proof of previous accidents in the
mezzanine, and the manager of the theatre testified that for 15 years that he had been there,
there had been no accidents."
''Continued user for a long period of time
without any accident negatived negligence arising out of claimed faulty construction."
The Court quoted with approval from Loftus v.
Union Ferry Co. of Brooklyn, 84 N. Y. 455, 38 Am. Rep.
533:
''The company had the experience of years
certifying to the sufficiency of the. guard. That
it was possible for a child or even a man to get
through the opening was apparent enough. But
that this was likely to occur was negatived by the
fact that multitudes of persons had passed over
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the bridge without the occurrence of such a
casualty. • • • We think the exerpption of the defendant in the case rests u;pon the fact . . . that
the company had no reason to apprehend an accident like this, ... ''
The Court also quoted with approval from La fflin
v. Buffalo & S. TV. R. R. Co., 106 N.Y. 136, 12 N.E. 599:
"No structure is ever so made that it may not
be made safer. But as a general rule, when an
appliance, or machine or structure not obviously
dangerous, has been in daily use for years, and
has uniformly proved adequate, safe, and convenient, its use may be continued without the
imputation of culpable imprudence or carelessness.''
In Rothstein v. Monette, 17 N.Y.S. (2d) 369, (1940),
it appeared that plaintiff entered defendant's restaurant
for breakfast on a morning when it was raining very
hard. She was carrying an umbrella, but she could not
recall whether or not she wor~ rubbers. After entering,
she closed her umbrella and was about to reach for a
check on the counter when her foot slipped on the wet
floor. She twisted her side and struck against the
counter but did not fall. The claim was made. that the
terrazzo floor was wet and muddy and also that there
was a slight depression in the floor. The jury rendered
a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed
from a judgment entered thereon. In affirming the
judgment, the reviewing court said:
"The fact that scores of customers had
walked over the floor daily and safely from the
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time it was laid was assurance to the defendant
that it was reasonably safe. He is not an insurer
of the safety of his customers. . . . It has been
held, and it is commonly known to laymen that
floors and steps constructed of tile, marble, terrazzo and hardwood have a smooth surface and
are slippery, especially when wet. But their use
is not negligent or unlawful, and if people fall
because the surface is hard and smooth there is
no liability, a person being required to use care
to avoid slipping.''
In the case of Garland v. Furst Store, 93 N.J.L. 127,
~07 A. 38, the plaintiff slipped on a concrete floor in the
basement of the defendant's store. The floor was shown
to be in good condition and the evidence showed that it
had been traversed by thousands of people every week
for four years, prior to the accident, and that no one
had ever been known to slip on it before. Said the
Court:
''The floor was undoubtedly smooth but apparently was not slippery as it had been traversed
by thousands of people every week for four years
since its construction and no one had been known
to slip there before. It would thus appear that
the premises were reasonably safe for the entry
thereon of persons resorting to the store, and it
is not shown that the defendant was guilty of
any act which would make them dangerous. In
fact there is no contention to that effect.''

In the case of Lawson v. D. H. Holmes Co. Ltd.,
(La.) 200 So. 163, heretofore cited and discussed, the
defendant's evidence showed that the entranceway to
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its store had been in use many years prior to the accident; that thousands of people walked over it daily, and
there had never been a complaint with respect to its
condition and no accient ever occured there before. Said
the Court:
"The defendant's testimony was, that thousands of people walked over this slab each day;
that they have been doing so for many years; that
there have been no complaints, and no other accident has ever occurred. This to our minds is a
strong circumstance which must be considered by
us in determining the condition of the step.''
(Italics added.)
In the case of J. C. Penney Company, Inc., v. 1!1aude
Robison, 128 0. St. 626, 193 N.E. 401, the Court said:
''Thousands of people patronized this store
every day. No one else is shown to have fallen
there. No one claims that any one else ever fell
by reason of the oiling of the floors.''
The Court also made the following pertinent observation:
''We agree that the right of trial by jury is
guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution of
Ohio, and it cannot be invaded or violated by
legislative act or judicial decree; but all this does
not mean that all cases, regardless of evidentiary
aspect, must be submitted to a jury. Under our
law it is just as pernicious to submit a case to a
jury and permit the jury to speculate with the
rights of citizens when no question for the jury
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is involved, as it is to deny to a citizen his trial
by jury when he has the right.''
The rules laid down by the above cited and quoted
cases, are in accord with sound reasoning. It is difficult to conceive what better evidence of the safe condition of the premises could be adduced than the fact
that the premises had been safely used in the same condition for a long period of time. Certainly a period of
fourteen or fifteen years is more than sufficient time
in which to test the safety of the entranceway. If this
entranceway had been hazardous, as the !plaintiff contends, other persons would have slipped on it and fallen,
sustaining injuries. It is a matter of common knowledge,
of which the Court can take judicial. notice, that for a
considerable portion of the calendar year, the streets
of Salt Lake City are covered with rain or snow. Whenever this condition occurs, water is invariably tracked
into mercantile houses, including this defendant's storP.
Yet, in all the past fourteen or fifteen years, there has
never been any accident in the entranceway to this store.
It is no answer to say that on other occasions when
the weather was wet a rubber mat was placed in front
of the door. While it is true that there is evidence in
the record that on previous occasions when it had been
storming, a rubber mat had been placed out by the defendant, the evidence further shows, that the mat was
in front of the revolving doo'rs only, and did not cover
the entire surface of the entranceway, and it particularly
did not cover the portion of the entranceway in front
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of the doors on either side of the revolving doors. Assumedly, the plaintiff would not have used the rubber
mat even if it had been out since she elected to enter
the store throug-h the door at the side of the revolving
door, rather than through the revolving- door. In any
event, a substantial portion of the entranceway is never
covered with rubber mats, and this portion of the entranceway is also traversed by the public.
By refusing to permit the defendants to show the
long record of safe use of the entranceway, the Court
deprived them of some of their most convincing evidence. It might well be, that if the Court had permitted
the defendants to make the ·proof which they offered to
make, that the jury would have returned a verdict in
favor of both defendants. The denial of this right, was
erroneous and highly prejudicial to the defendant's
defense.

Not only would this evidence be rna terial as to the
relative safety of the entranceway-it would also be
material to show want of notice on the part of defendant that there was any dangerous condition in connection with its entranceway.
CONCLUSION
The record is entirely free of any evidence of negligence on the part of this defendant. On the contrary,
the record shows conclusively that the entranceway to
the defendant's store was of the safest possible type
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cepted law, there was no duty on the part of the defendant to give warning of the wet condition of the entranceway. Such a warning would have been futile and would
have conveyed to the plaintiff no information which she
did not already possess. Moreover, the jury found by
its verdict of no cause of action in favor of the defendant, Salisbury Investment Company, that the entranceway was in fact of a safe type of construction. Its verdict against this defendant was inconsistent, violative
of the instructions of the Court and contrary to law.
For these reasons the judgment of the trial court should
bs reversed, and the trial court should be directed to
enter a judgment in favor of this defendant, no cause
of action.
Even if the Court should be of the opinion, that the
above contentions of the defendant are not well taken,
the judgment should, in any event, be reversed and a
new trial granted, because of prejudicial error by the
- Court in excluding defendant's proferred evidence on
the long history of safe use of the entranceway to the
premises.
Respectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN &
CHRISTENSEN,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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